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Abstract
In the 2010s in Turkey, the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) authoritarian-populist turn accompanied the
institutionalization of political Islam. As laicism was discredited and labeled as an imposed-from-above principle of West-
ern/Kemalist modernity, the notion of equality ceased to inform the state’s gender policies. In response to AKP’s attempts
to redefine gender relations through the notions of complementarity and fıtrat (purpose of creation), women across the
political spectrum have mobilized for an understanding of gender equality that transcends the laicism–Islamism divide
yet maintains secularity as its constitutive principle. Analyzing three recent attempts of women’s coalition-building, this
article shows that, first, gender equality activists in the 2010s are renegotiating the border between secularity and piety
towards more inclusive understandings of gender equality; and second, that struggles against AKP’s gender politics are
fragmented due to different configurations of gender equality and secularity that reflect class and ethnic antagonisms in
Turkish society. The article thereby argues for the need to move beyond binary approaches to secularism and religion that
have so far dominated the scholarly analysis of women’s activism in both Turkey and the Nordic context.
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1. Introduction
Recent contributions in gender studies scholarship have
widely documented, in Western and non-Western coun-
tries alike, the tension between politicized religion and
gender equality struggles (e.g., Dhaliwal & Yuval-Davis,
2014; Jeffreys, 2011; Razavi & Jenichen, 2010; Tadros,
2015). Simultaneously, feminist movements inmany con-
texts seek strategies to reclaim gender equality while
challenging the divisions between secularism and reli-
gion (e.g., Cuesta & Mulinari, 2018; Martinsson, 2016;
Moghadam, 2017). In Turkey, the consolidation of politi-
cal Islam under the rule of the Justice and Development
Party (AKP) has recently coupled with all-out discrimina-
tion against secular social groups (Eligür, 2010). As I ar-
gue in the following, this has inclined gender equality ac-
tivists (feminist and women’s and LGBTQ rights activists
of various political persuasions) to organize beyond the
laicism–Islamismdivide and to buildmore inclusive strug-
gles for gender equality.
After a decade of EU accession-oriented gender
equality reforms in the 2000s, Turkey’s gender regime
is undergoing significant changes in line with the
AKP’s authoritarian-populist turn (Akçay, 2018; Esen &
Gümüşçü, 2016; Güneş, 2017). In the institutional frame-
work of politics, gender equality is being replaced by
the Islamic notions of fıtrat (purpose of creation) that
attributes differential natures to men and women, and
gender complementarity which designates the family
as “the only institution within which women’s sexual-
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ity can rightly be expressed and their sanctified role,
motherhood, realized” (Özyeğin, 2015, p. 197). In 2017,
three significant initiatives of women’s coalition-building
set out to challenge Turkey’s changing gender regime
as shaped by AKP’s authoritarian populism: the “Don’t
Mess with My Outfit!” (Kıyafetime Karışma!) campaign,
the Equality, Justice, Woman Summit (Eşitlik, Adalet,
Kadın Zirvesi), and the “Women Are Strong Together”
(Kadınlar Birlikte Güçlü) campaign. All still ongoing, these
initiatives have several common features. First, they de-
fend gender equality with secularity as one of its core
principles. Second, despite being organized largely by
women who identify as feminist, they avoid the use
of the controversialized concept of ”feminism” in their
political framing to form broader alliances. Third, they
address “all women”, including pious women, with the
prospect of mobilizing them against AKP’s gender poli-
tics. In this article, I analyze these coalition-building ini-
tiatives based on ethnographic research conducted on-
line between March 2017 and June 2018, as well as an
examination of the media coverage of gender equality
activism in the given period. In the case of the third ini-
tiative, “Women Are Strong Together”, I also integrate
the informal exchanges between me and the organizers
of the campaign, which took place in March 2018. Ana-
lyzing the political dynamics of these initiatives, I show
that, first, gender equality activists in the 2010s are rene-
gotiating the border between secularity and piety; sec-
ond, that struggles against AKP’s gender politics are frag-
mented due to different configurations of gender equal-
ity and secularity that reflect class and ethnic antago-
nisms in Turkish society.
There is a widespread tendency in gender stud-
ies scholarship to treat the “laicist” and “Islamist” sec-
tions of women’s activism as homogenous, binary cat-
egories (e.g., Çaha, 2013; Turam, 2012). Contrary to
this tendency, some recent studies employ the cate-
gories “secular” and “pious” in a non-binary (but still co-
constitutive) fashion (e.g., Frank & Çelik, 2017; Kandiy-
oti, 2011; Özyeğin, 2015). Building on these studies, I ar-
gue that the latter approach allows to better under-
stand the dynamics of coalition-building which reflect
the ways in which women articulate gender equality
based on their differential political belongings. Follow-
ing Saba Mahmood, I differentiate between political sec-
ularism and secularity, where “[t]he former pertains to
the modern state’s relationship to, and regulation of,
religion, while the latter refers to the set of concepts,
norms, sensibilities, and dispositions that characterize
secular societies and subjectivities” (Mahmood, 2016,
p. 3). In Turkey, political secularism took the form of
laicism (laiklik), which entailed that the religion was not
removed from, but rather interpreted, overseen, and ad-
ministered by the Turkish state (Davison, 2003). Since the
rise of political Islam in Turkey and globally in the 1980s,
laicism has been discursively reconstructed in binary op-
position to Islamism. Instead, I suggest an analysis that
builds on the concepts of secularity and piety in a mu-
tually inclusive manner. As Deniz Kandiyoti has stated,
“[t]hosewishing to use religious arguments to achieve [a]
more progressive reading of women’s rights are de facto
members of secular spaces since feminists—of whatever
persuasion—have little to gain from a closure of public
deliberation” (quoted in Tadros, 2015, p. 664). In the con-
cluding section of the article, I reflect on how such an
analysis can also contribute to feminist strategies in the
Nordic context.
2. Laicism–Islamism: A Gendered Divide
Since the foundation of modern Turkey in 1923, laicism
has been one of the key principles that informed Ke-
malism, the founding ideology of the Republic. More
than a simple separation between the state and reli-
gion, it functioned as a means to national sovereignty
against religious authority and a scientific approach that
enabled modern social organization (Çelik, 2006). Ke-
malist laicism shaped gender relations through a series
of reforms in education (in 1924), attire (in 1925), civil
rights (in 1926), and language (in 1928). The 1926 Civil
Code outlawed polygamy and brought gender equal-
ity in the matters of marriage, divorce, child custody
and inheritance, thereby strengthening women’s posi-
tion within the family and enabling their public par-
ticipation in greater numbers. Laicism-related reforms,
notwithstanding their ambiguous and not always advan-
tageous results for lower-class women (see Kocabicak,
2018; Makal & Toksöz, 2012), changed women’s social
status and involved them as active subjects in nation-
building processes. Kemalists thought that women were
oppressed because of “backward” traditions and “reac-
tionary” interpretations of Islam, and laicism would en-
sure gender equality between men and women. Yet, in
the Kemalist project, laicism was intimately linked to
modernism/Westernism and Turkish nationalism. This
limited the public inclusion of those women who could
not keep up with the modernization/Westernization and
Turkification efforts of the new regime. Although Ke-
malism eliminated religion from the political sphere, it
favored a certain interpretation of Islam that was car-
ried out by the Directorate of Religious Affairs (hereafter
Diyanet) established in 1924, and maintained the Sunni-
Muslim identity as the desirable moral and behavioral di-
mension of Turkish citizenship (Atasoy, 2011). Through a
strategic use of the modern-traditional binary, the non-
Turkish and non-Sunni Muslim populations (e.g., Kurds,
Alevis, Arabs) were provided with less access to the Ke-
malist public sphere, as they were labeled “backward”
or “reactionary” subjects in need of modernization. The
modern-traditional binary also divided women into the
categories “covered” and “uncovered” (see Göle, 1996;
Yeğenoğlu, 1998), associating laicism with a lifestyle de-
fined by the adoption of Western attire and mixed-sex
socialization as opposed to veiling and gender segrega-
tion. Laicism’s association with lifestyle rendered gen-
der equality reforms important means to maintain the
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Kemalist imaginary of a classless society. As the modern-
traditional binary evolved into the laicism–Islamism di-
vide over the decades, women’s attire remained having
a central role in discussions around laicism, gender equal-
ity, and women’s public participation.
After Turkey’s transition to a multi-party regime in
1946, right-wing parties in power articulated Islamic be-
liefs and practices into the official ideology as compo-
nents of Turkish culture,making it possible for Turkish na-
tionalism to become more widespread than it had previ-
ously (Brockett, 2011). Following the 1980 military coup,
the 1982 Constitution defined Islam a constituent of the
official ideology under the label “Atatürk nationalism”.
The cultural sphere became subject to strict state surveil-
lance together with the introduction of compulsory reli-
gious education and the adoption of the “Turkish-Islamic
synthesis” as a dominant educational narrative (Keyman
& Kancı, 2011). Throughout this time, despite the com-
promises in the implementation of the laicism princi-
ple and conservative politicians’ increasing emphasis on
women’s role as mothers and wives (Sancar, 2012), cov-
ered women remained excluded from the public sphere
and gender equality activists (back then mainly Kemal-
ist and socialist women) did not tackle the problematic
relationship between laicism and gender equality. Since
the late-1980s, Islamism’s gender project has drawn on
a modern interpretation of political Islam in which the
covered, educated Muslim woman posed a challenge to
Western/Kemalist modernity (Çakır, 2000) and to the Ke-
malist narrative of women’s rights. An increasing num-
ber of covered women organized against their exclu-
sion from education and civil service. Their active par-
ticipation in the Islamist civil society and political par-
ties destabilized the proposition that laicism was the
precondition for women’s public inclusion. At the same
time, the laicism–Islamism divide, now a grand narra-
tive into which all other social antagonisms would be ar-
ticulated (see Kandiyoti, 2012), infiltrated gender equal-
ity activism (this time including feminist women), show-
ing itself in the disputes over the headscarf issue (see
Çağatay, 2017).
3. AKP’s Authoritarian-Populist Turn and Turkey’s
Changing Gender Regime
Coming to power in 2002, the AKP distanced itself from
the anti-Western discourse of the previous Islamist par-
ties and supported globalization and Turkey’s EU mem-
bership while adopting the protection of the family and
traditional values in its “Conservative Democracy” pro-
gram (Coşar & Özkan-Kerestecioğlu, 2017; Ilkkaracan,
2017). In its first two terms in office (2002–2011), in line
with Turkey’s EU accession prospect, the party enabled
significant improvements in women’s rights by incorpo-
rating the notion of gender equality in the Constitution
(in 2004 and 2010), the Penal Code (in 2004) and the La-
bor Code (in 2003), and by establishing an Equal Opportu-
nity Commission in the Parliament in 2009 (AldıkaçtıMar-
shall, 2013; Müftüler-Baç, 2012). In the 2010s, however,
the notion of equality ceased to inform the state’s gender
policies as the AKP discredited laicism by labeling it as
an imposed-from-above principle of Western/Kemalist
modernity. Starting with the then Prime Minister Tayyip
Erdoğan’s declaration that he did not believe in gender
equality (Cumhuriyet, 2010), fıtrat and complementar-
ity gradually became dominant themes in Turkey’s gen-
der regime. In 2011, the State Ministry responsible for
Women and the Family became the Ministry of Family
and Social Policy (Ministry of Labor, Social Services and
Family as of June 2018), reflecting the party view on
women as primarily mothers, wives, and daughters. In
2015, the Constitutional Court decriminalized religious
marriage unaccompanied by civil marriage, abolishing a
legal measure that was adopted in 1936 in order to pro-
tect the rights that women gained through civil marriage
(Kuyucu, 2016). In 2017, the Parliament passed a bill (the
so-called Mufti law) that allows muftis (religious civil ser-
vants) to perform civil marriages despite the widely held
view that this would encourage child marriages and fur-
ther polarize Turkish society along the laicism–Islamism
divide. In the same year, the 2010 primeministerial circu-
lar, issued to increase women’s employment and ensure
equal opportunities, was revised. In the new draft of the
circular the word “equality” was omitted, together with
the previously adopted measures of equal pay for equal
work, inspection of the establishment of crèches and day-
care centers to support women’s employment, and in-
clusion of women’s organizations in decision-making pro-
cesses regarding gender equality at work (Women’s La-
bor and Employment Initiative [KEIG], 2017).
These changes in Turkey’s gender regime are not
stand-alone developments but crucial to the AKP’s
authoritarian-populist turn. Since the party came to
power, part of its populist strategy has been to deepen
the laicism–Islamism divide by building on a discourse
of an “omnipotent Kemalist state repressing the weak
society” (Alaranta, 2015). The pre-AKP Turkey was
narrated as “a land of military tutelage and elitism
where secular republican elites oppressed believers with
their top-down policies of modernization and betrayed
their own Islamic roots with their Westward-looking re-
forms” (Kandiyoti & Emanet, 2017, p. 873). Through
government-dependent trade unions and civil society (in-
cluding women’s) organizations, the party formulated
whatwas in fact an intra-elite conflict over state power as
an antagonism between the people and the elite (Akçay,
2018; Yabancı, 2016). In so doing, the AKP mobilized
support for a Muslim nationalism, presenting Turkey as
an alternative civilizational center to Europe and nour-
ishing neo-Ottomanist aspirations of becoming a domi-
nant player in the Middle East (Alaranta, 2015; Işıksal &
Göksel, 2018; White, 2013). In the 2010s, challenged by
events such as theGezi-inspired protests of 2013, clashes
with the Gülenists (members of a politically powerful Is-
lamist order) within the state, termination of the peace
process with the KurdistanWorkers’ Party (PKK), and the
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failed coup d’état of 2016, the AKP embarked on increas-
ingly authoritarian ways of ruling to remain in power.
The failed coup and the ensuing state of emergency—
declared to purge the Gülenists from both state and pri-
vate institutions—gave the government a valid excuse to
increase the political violence directed towards the social
opposition as a whole. In themeantime, AKP’s post-coup
alliance with the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) further
consolidated the nationalist dimension of its authoritar-
ian turn and elevated Erdoğan to the status of the leader
of the right-wing electorate (Türkmen & Küçük, 2016). In
all these developments:
Gender norms and specifically women’s conduct and
propriety play a key role in delineating the bound-
aries between ‘us’ (God-fearing, Sunni, AKP support-
ers), and a ‘them’ consisting of all political detractors
and minorities, cast as potentially treasonous and im-
moral. (Kandiyoti, 2016, p. 105)
Accompanying AKP’s authoritarian-populist turn is the
introduction of various mechanisms that privilege (and
further impose) a Turkish-Muslim identity. In this, the
Diyanet acts as the key institution to realize the party’s
repeatedly stated mission to raise “pious generations”.
Diyanet’s role in reframing social relations, including gen-
der, is most remarkably observed in changes in the ed-
ucational system. In the 2010s, religious (imam-hatip)
as well as private schools were prioritized over—and at
times replaced—secular public schools, reproducing not
only the supremacy of the majority sect but also the
economic interests of the AKP-favored group of elites
(Bayhan, 2017). During this time, the notions of fıtrat
and complementarity have entered the school curric-
ula through school books deeming marriage with atheist
people or people belonging to other religions unaccept-
able, associating premarital relationships with adultery,
and definingwoman’s obedience to her husband as a reli-
gious duty performed in return for the husband’s respon-
sibility over the family economy (Cumhuriyet, 2017).
Yet, privileging a Turkish-Muslim identity in itself
does not hinder women’s public participation. Covered
women, already homogenized and utilized by Kemal-
ists and Islamists alike, played an important role in
AKP’s populist appeal as the party assumed the role
of representing Muslim women’s rights. Under the AKP
rule, the laicism–Islamism divide kept being reproduced
over women’s bodies but the link between laicism and
women’s public inclusion further diminished as covered
women participated in the public sphere in greater
numbers. In the 2000s, drawing on the EU’s human
rights framework, the party framed the headscarf is-
sue as a matter of individual rights and freedoms. Cov-
ered women became visible in the highest ranks of the
state, first as wives of the AKP elite, then as bureau-
crats and politicians themselves. The rise of an AKP-
supported bourgeoisie (Gümüşçü & Sert, 2009) and the
advancement of the Islamist women’s movement (Ak-
soy, 2015) supported their upward class mobility. Be-
tween 2011 and 2016, the ban on the headscarf was
removed in public universities, the Parliament, courts,
primary education (both for teachers and for girls from
age 9), the police department, and various other fields
of civil service. Today, nearly 4.5 million women have
membership in the women’s auxiliaries of AKP (AK Parti
Kadın Kolları, 2017). An increasing number of female
civil servants are hired in the Diyanet and the Ministry
of Labor, Social Services and Family (Ministry of Fam-
ily and Social Policy until June 2018), institutions re-
sponsible for redesigning gender relations according to
fıtrat and complementarity (see Adak, 2015; Maritato,
2017). AKP’s ideal of “strengthening the family institu-
tion” does not correspond to women’s confinement in
the familial sphere; unlike the Kemalist assumption that
Islamism and women’s public participation were incom-
patible, the latter proved to be inherent to the AKP’s so-
cial engineering program.
4. Repositioning of Gender Equality Activists: Towards
an Inclusionary Feminism?
Alongside the AKP’s authoritarian-populist turn and the
retrogression in women’s rights, several other factors
led gender equality activists to reposition themselves
vis-à-vis AKP’s gender politics and to seek broader al-
liances to challenge its rule. First, since the beginning
of AKP’s third term in office (2011–2015), women’s or-
ganizations that had achieved considerable success in
shaping Turkey’s gender politics during the EU-oriented
reform period were excluded from decision-making pro-
cesses (Çağatay, 2018; Doyle, 2018). This pushed gender
equality activists who previously pursued gender politics
in platforms facilitated by Turkey’s EU candidacy and the
global gender equality regime (Kardam, 2005) into the
counter-public sphere, including not only Kemalist, egali-
tarian, and Kurdish feminists but also Islamist women’s
rights activists. Second, in this period, “feminism” got
discredited, especially by Erdoğan who portrayed femi-
nists as Western agents acting against national interests,
“women who did not belong to Turkish-Muslim culture
and civilization” (Bianet, 2015). During the post-coup all-
out attack on the social opposition, feminist journalists,
writers, and activists got arrested; academics who sup-
ported women’s and LGBTQ rights were purged. Kurdish
feminists received a disproportionate share of state vio-
lence. Politicians (including members of the Parliament)
were jailed, women’s organizations and news agencies
were shut down, municipality-run crisis centers available
for women in the Kurdish region closed (Baysal, 2017;
Gülbahar, 2017), showing clearly how Islamism and anti-
feminism intertwined with Turkish nationalism. Third,
during the AKP rule, feminism got “side-streamed” (Al-
varez, 2014) thanks to feminists’ successful awareness
raising campaigns as well as their active involvement in
various sites of oppositional politics. Opposition parties,
particularly the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party
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(HDP) and the Kemalist Republican People’s Party (CHP),
not only participated in the Parliamentwith feministMPs
but also adopted feminist terminology and analysis in
their program (Kabasakal Arat, 2017). Fourth, both the
experience of collective action during the Gezi-inspired
protests and AKP’s populism increasingly dividing peo-
ple into “us” and “them” encouraged oppositional ac-
tors across the political spectrum, including feminists
and the pro-Islamist left, to position themselves in an (al-
beit loosely defined) anti-AKP front. This positioning, to-
gether with the side-streaming of feminism, made gen-
der equality a potential pivot point around which de-
mands for equal citizenship could be built.
Finally, yet importantly, the political differentiation
between different groups of covered women became
visible. The AKP, in the legal processes it initiated to
lift the headscarf ban, did not consult with the Islamist
women’s rights activists, who have been experts on this
subject (Aksoy, 2015, p. 161), as these women were in-
volved in gender equality activism. Furthermore, some
covered women who were among the AKP’s co-founders
were later excluded from the party ranks upon criticizing
the government’s anti-democratic policies. In the post-
coup period, Islamist women who were associated with
the Gülenists got arrested, lost their jobs, and faced dif-
ferent forms of state violence. Meanwhile, an increas-
ing number of pious women, especially those belonging
to the upper classes and younger generations, found a
“feminist vein” in themselves through which they “de-
velop[ed] a critique of the masculine understanding and
interpretation of gender relations in Islam” (Özyeğin,
2015). Such a feminist vein has also led to political or-
ganizing based on a new pious female identity like in the
case of the Reçel (jam) Blog or the Muslims Against Vi-
olence Towards Women Initiative (see Akyılmaz & Kök-
salan, 2016; Özinanır, 2016). As more and more covered
women raised their voices against the AKP rule, they be-
came plausible actors for coalition-building against the
party’s gender politics. Taken together, these factors in-
clined some gender equality activists to go beyond the
laicism–Islamism divide in challenging AKP’s gender pol-
itics, which made possible the coalition-building initia-
tives I analyze below.
4.1. Don’t Mess with My Outfit!
Initiated by the left-feminist “We Will Stop Femicide”
Platform (KCDP), the “Don’t Mess with My Outfit!”
demonstrations took place over the summer of 2017 in
Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. They were a reaction to the
increasing physical and verbal attacks onwomenwho did
not cover or dress ‘modestly’ in public, carried out by
men who seemed to have been encouraged by the neg-
ative views high rank government representatives and
state officials express on the secular lifestyle. That the
perpetrators of these attacks were not charged or con-
demned by government officials strengthened the im-
pression that women who did not adopt a pious lifestyle
(thus dress code) were not worthy of state protection.
Protestors who gathered at the demonstrations declared
that women will not remain silent on the “increasing
attacks on women’s lifestyle, dress and modern rights”
(Bianet, 2017a). Linking these attacks to state policies
and the widespread violence against women, they em-
phasized that the dress and lifestyle-related impositions
on women come back to them as violence and murder.
Remaining loyal to the KCDP’s main agenda, the demon-
strations treated violence against women as a universal
common ground (see Grewal, 2005) where activists with
differential political belongings could meet.
The “Don’t Mess with My Outfit!” campaign brought
together an array of gender equality activists. Mem-
bers of the LGBTQ community joined after the Istanbul
Pride March was deemed “against public morality” and
banned by the authorities (The New Arab, 2017). Ke-
malist feminists participated in defense of a laic state
and against inegalitarian gender politics (Hürriyet, 2017).
A young covered woman held a placard that said, “Don’t
mess with my shorts or my headscarf!”, exemplifying
how the lifestyle argument appealed to both groups of
women. The demonstrations grew into Women’s Coun-
cils in several cities in Turkey under KCDP’s leadership.
OnMarch 11, 2018, theWomen’s Council of Turkey gath-
ered in a meeting in Istanbul, bringing together more
than 500 women from 25 different cities. At this meet-
ing, where covered women were a small but visible mi-
nority, participants agreed to not allow interventions in
women’s clothing and discussed how to resist the “out-
rageous” attempts to regulate women’s behavior accord-
ing to strict gender roles (Deutsche Welle, 2018).
The campaign was a powerful attempt at coalition-
building because it drew attention to the instrumental-
ization of women’s attire by governments in the name of
political projects of belonging and, as such, it addressed
“all women”. Yet, the campaign’s framing of the rela-
tionship between gender equality and secularity primar-
ily as a lifestyle issue is problematic because it limits
the differences betweenwomen to the cultural/religious
sphere, overlooking howwomen’s experience of lifestyle-
based discrimination differ based on their class posi-
tion. Since the 2000s, women’s increased participation
in public life went hand-in-hand with an overall transfor-
mation in the relations of production and reproduction
through neoliberal policies that deepened the class di-
visions between women (see Akkan, 2018; KEIG, 2013).
Urban, educated, upper-class women who had the finan-
cial means to outsource their housework and care work
responsibilities could participate in public life on more
equal footing with men. But lower-class women’s em-
ployment in low-paid, flexible, insecure jobs, which were
thought to be the continuation of their natural roles as
mothers and wives (i.e., based on their fıtrat), left them
economically dependent on the men in their families
or the state (see Alnıaçık, Altan-Olcay, Deniz, & Gökşen,
2017; Kılıç, 2008). Thus, it is lower-class women who, be-
cause of their higher dependence on access to state ser-
Social Inclusion, 2018, Volume 6, Issue 4, Pages 48–58 52
vices, suffer from lifestyle-based discrimination themost.
For example, women seeking shelter frommale violence
might receive aid from the municipality depending on
whether they cover (Ilkkaracan, 2017, p. 82), or divorced
women might not receive state protection against vio-
lence because they “willingly” remain outside the fam-
ily institution (Özar & Yakut-Çakar, 2013). Babül’s (2015)
research on the evaluation of the worthiness of rights
seekers show that policy makers’ “[p]ortrayals of women
and children as innocent, depoliticized victims in need
of care and protection…narrows the category of rights
bearers by excluding groups who do not conform to the
image of the helpless victim” (Babül, 2015, p. 116). In
this case, KCDP’s homogenization and universalization
of women as victims of male violence in relation to
lifestyle-based discrimination might not challenge but
assist the changing gender regime under the AKP rule,
whereas integrating a class perspectivewould contribute
to the de-naturalization of fıtrat and complementarity-
based arguments.
4.2. Justice, Equality, Woman Summit
On November 30 and December 1, 2017, the Equality,
Justice, Woman Summit brought together 363 civil soci-
ety organizations and around 900 women from 48 cities.
It was organized by the initiative of Gülseren Onanç from
the Kemalist CHP, who gathered an organizing commit-
tee of feminist academics and public figures and the logis-
tic support of a CHP-ledmunicipality in Istanbul. The sum-
mit was mainly a joint event of egalitarian and Kemalist
feminists, but it also hosted a number of left feminist and
Islamist women’s rights activists. The summit organizers
formulated women’s struggle for equality and justice as
constitutive of a broader oppositional agenda. They drew
attention to the loss of impact of women’s organizations
on gender policy-making in a political atmosphere dom-
inated by violence, militarism, and authoritarianism. All
those having democratic demands, regardless of their po-
litical belonging, ethnic identity, and sexual orientation,
were invited (Kadın Zirvesi, n.d.).
The summit title was strategically chosen to counter
the pro-AKP women’s agenda to replace “gender equal-
ity” with “gender justice”. In the 2010s, as women’s
organizations who previously participated in the EU-
oriented issue-based platforms were repositioned in
the counter-public sphere, AKP-established anti-feminist
GONGOs (government-organized non-governmental or-
ganizations), such as the Women and Democracy Associ-
ation (KADEM), took over the role of representing Turkey
at transnational feminist processes such as Beijing+20 or
the GREVIO (Çağatay, 2018; Doyle, 2018). KADEM, involv-
ing both covered and not covered women in its body, ad-
vocates for the reorganization of gender relations based
on fıtrat and complementarity under the brand name
“gender justice”, arguing that this notion transcends the
Western notion of “gender equality” (Hürriyet, 2015).
Against this argument, the CHP-supported Equality, Jus-
tice, Woman Summit manifests that, without equality,
there can be no justice.
Considering the predominant presence of Kemalist
feminists as organizers and participants, the lack of any
reference to laicism, Kemalism or feminism in the fram-
ing of the summit was striking. The CHP leader Kılıç-
daroğlu’s denunciation of the headscarf’s instrumental-
ization in politics and admission of his party’s responsi-
bility in deepening the laicism–Islamism divide (CHP TV,
2017), followed by a panel on “gender equality and
egalitarian interpretations of Islam”, was a clear invi-
tation for pious women to join the summit. The orga-
nizers’ intention to form a broad coalition for gender
equality was noticeable in the calls they made for orga-
nized solidarity among women and the wide range of
women’s and LGBTQ issues discussed at the summit, in-
cluding problems in paid employment, access to state
services, gender-based violence, participation in politics
and decision-making, and the backlash against universal
rights (Kadın Zirvesi, n.d.).
Yet, a similarly inclusionary attitudewas absentwhen
it came to the topics of nationalism, peace, and the Kur-
dish conflict. These were addressed neither in the panel
topics nor in the final declaration of the summit, an oth-
erwise comprehensive document comprising a set of de-
mands regarding “equal opportunities for citizens of dif-
ferent gender, language, religion, sexual orientation, and
political belonging” (Bianet, 2017b). Feminist initiatives
that work for the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish con-
flict, such as the Women’s Initiative for Peace, were not
invited to participate in the summit. The exclusion of
topics related to nationalism and peace from the sum-
mit agenda and of pro-Kurdish gender equality activists
from the list of invited speakers can be partly explained
by the AKP’s criminalization of the public support for
pro-Kurdish politics as an “act supporting terrorism” and
the summit organizers’ unwillingness to take the risk of
defaming their initiative. But a more accurate explana-
tion seems to be sheer nationalism. Since the 1990s, Ke-
malists’ refusal to coalesce with secular pro-Kurdish ac-
tors as equal partners against the rise of Islamist gen-
der politics—despite the importance of Kurdish feminists
as allies in articulating gender equality with secularity—
has been a constitutive dynamic of the laicism–Islamism
divide (Çağatay, 2017). Similarly, the summit organiz-
ers’ unwillingness to tackle Turkish nationalism and ex-
press open support for the peaceful resolution of the
Kurdish conflict casts a shadow on their otherwise in-
clusive coalition for gender equality. Notwithstanding, in
May 2018, the summit curator Gülseren Onanç launched
the Equality, Justice, Woman Platform that aims to bring
together Turkey’s gender equality activists in an online
platform. Both the participation of the pro-Kurdish HDP
representatives in the launch ceremony of the platform
(Bianet, 2018) and the focus on issues related to peace
and conflict resolution in the platform website (esit-
likadaletkadin.org) hint that for Kemalist and egalitarian
feminists amore open engagement with the Kurdish con-
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flict and willingness to coalesce with Kurdish feminists
might be forthcoming.
4.3. Women Are Strong Together
The “Women Are Strong Together” campaign was initi-
ated by a group of feminist and women’s rights activists
in January 2017. Women involved in the campaign or-
ganized simultaneous demonstrations in Istanbul and
Ankara in January 2018 against the Diyanet’s intrusion
into everyday life practices. In the 2010s, Diyanet’s
weight in shaping gender relations increased as the in-
stitution gained more administrative power through its
nation-wide Family and Counseling Bureaus and joint
projects with the Ministry of Labor, Social Services and
Family and the Ministry of Education. Alongside run-
ning educational programs on “strengthening the fam-
ily institution”, the Diyanet releases fatwas propagating
the notions of fıtrat and complementarity, such as la-
beling feminism as immorality; allowing for men to di-
vorce their wives via email, SMS, or phone call; or ap-
proving nine-year-old girls’ eligibility for marriage ac-
cording to Islamic rules (BBC, 2018). Although fatwas
are not legally binding, they still have the discursive
power to shape social attitudes towards gender. It was
the latter fatwa, together with the so-called Mufti law
that allowed muftis to perform civil marriages and po-
tentially encouraged child marriages, which urged the
“Women Are Strong Together” initiative to react. Orga-
nizers of the well-attended demonstrations denounced
Diyanet’s fatwas that legitimized sexual abuse of young
girls and stated that no state institution can express sup-
port for sexual crimes. Pointing at the disproportionately
big state budget allocated to the Diyanet, they claimed
that the taxes collected from women were invested in
restricting their lives (Evrensel, 2018).
The demonstrations thus created a common ground
for “all women” to unite for equal citizenship rights, with-
out state-imposed restrictions on gender relations. Ad-
dressing the state, instead of the AKP government, is
an inclusionary strategy of coalition-building because, by
pointing to the patriarchal nature of the state as an insti-
tution that seeksmen’s interests, it goes beyond not only
the laicism–Islamism binary but also the pro-AKP versus
anti-AKP socio-political divide. Since the late-1980s, fem-
inist movements in Turkey have challenged Islamist gen-
der politics from the perspective of patriarchy. In the
feminist view, the labeling of the headscarf by Kemalists
as “anti-laic”, while Islamist men occupied high positions
in state institutions, showed how laicism and national
identity were constructed by and through women’s bod-
ies. Feminists supported covered women’s struggle to
participate in public life as a demand of equal citizen-
ship but at the same time criticized the conservative,
Sunni-Muslim female role model defined by her familial
responsibilities. Thismade it possible for feminists to pur-
sue gender politics without taking sides on the laicism–
Islamism divide. Similarly, in the demonstrations target-
ing the Diyanet, framing gender equality as an institu-
tional alongside a lifestyle issue and demanding the sec-
ularity of state organs from the perspective of equal citi-
zenship denounced the privileging of the Turkish-Muslim
identity without associating the practice of coveringwith
Islamist politics.
When its agenda is evaluated as a whole, the all-
encompassing character of the “Women Are Strong To-
gether” campaign comes to light. Gender equality ac-
tivists involved in the campaign have so far organized
a series of events and demonstrations that challenged
not only the laicism–Islamism binary but also Turkish
nationalism, neoliberalism, and heterosexism. Its flexi-
ble organization in the form of issue-based action al-
lows for the participation of feminists of different polit-
ical persuasions as well as LGBTQ and Islamist women’s
rights activists, with a changing composition depending
on the topic at hand. In terms of women’s coalition-
building, this flexibility bears potentialities as well as lim-
itations. The strategy to simultaneously address the mul-
tiple forms of inequality that disadvantage women with-
out reducing them toAKP’s authoritarian populismoffers
an intersectional political framework for organizations
such as the Muslims Against Violence Towards Women
Initiative or theWomen’s Initiative for Peace to articulate
their single-issue agendas into a broader struggle for gen-
der equality. As such, the “Women Are Strong Together”
campaign comes closest to formulating an inclusive no-
tion of gender equality. Yet, the very flexibility of the
campaign hinders the potential to develop its wide range
of gender equality demands into a more coherent politi-
cal program. The antagonistic political belongings of the
campaign’s participants, such as those of Kemalist and
Kurdish feminists, can only be contained, but not tran-
scended, in a loose form of organization that does not
provide much space for political deliberation.
5. Conclusions
From the early years of the Republic in the 1920s un-
til the end of the 2000s, gender equality and laicism
have been constitutive—although instrumentalized—
elements of Turkey’s official ideology. In the 2010s, AKP’s
authoritarian-populist turn initiated shifts in the gender
regime based on the notions of fıtrat and complemen-
tarity as part of a Turkish-Muslim social engineering pro-
gram. This period also saw the disintegration of the re-
lationship between laicism and (covered) women’s pub-
lic participation, political differentiation among covered
women, the side-streaming of feminism, and the artic-
ulation of gender equality as a potential pivot point
around which to build demands for equal citizenship.
This conjuncture mobilized gender equality activists to
build coalitions that maintained secularity and piety in
a mutually inclusive manner.
In this article, I focused on three such initiatives
of women’s coalition-building and discussed their polit-
ical dynamics. These initiatives commonly address “all
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women”, including pious women, and aim to mobilize
them against the AKP’s gender politics. Organizers of
these initiatives do not refer in their political framing
to feminism and laicism but instead to gender equal-
ity and secularity, as a tactic to avoid both confronta-
tions over contested topics that might be detrimental
to coalition-building and being labeled as marginal, anti-
national, Western agents. In this framing, they also re-
frain from publicizing their political affiliations, adopting
instead broad titles for their initiatives that can serve as
blanket terms. In fact, looking at the constituents of the
“Don’t Mess with My Outfit!” and “Women Are Strong
Together” campaigns and the Justice, Equality, Woman
Summit it is clear that various groups organize and/or
attend to multiple initiatives of coalition-building simul-
taneously, making it difficult to draw clear lines of divi-
sion between gender equality activists’ political affilia-
tions. These ongoing initiatives of coalition-building are
promising attempts to build solidarity among women be-
yond the laicism–Islamism divide and to raise demands
for equal citizenship. They indicate, as Özyeğin argues,
that pious and secular subjects “can no longer perceive
one another in terms of rigidly defined anonymous so-
cial categories that carry information about each other’s
moral status and views” (Özyeğin, 2015, p. 224). At the
same time, actors who articulate gender equality with
secularity are not a uniform ‘equality front’ but divided
from within due to their differential political belongings.
Specifically, Turkish nationalism and the Kurdish con-
flict constitute a major line of division among women’s
groups; class inequalities are not fully incorporated in
gender equality agendas; and LGBTQ issues are only su-
perficially addressed in political framings.
Recent developments in gender equality struggles,
some of which I examined here, bring a scholarly need
to shift our analytical lens in the study of women’s ac-
tivismaway frombinary approaches to secularismand re-
ligion. Such a shift might be useful in the Nordic context
to destabilize the “mythical mantra of gender equality”
and to highlight the affinity between the state, nation-
alism, secularism, and dominant understandings of gen-
der equality (Martinsson, Griffin, & Giritli Nygren, 2016;
see also Liinason, 2018b). There is a striking similarity be-
tween the Turkish and Scandinavian models of gender
equality in their emphasis on the secular state and iden-
tity posed in opposition to traditionalized religion (Berg,
Lundahl, & Martinsson, 2016). Including southern per-
spectives in discussionswithin the north, as Kabeer, Stark
andMagnus (2008) suggest, can shed light onto the large
amount of work to be donewith regards to gender equal-
ity in Scandinavia by “reversing the gaze”. This work in-
cludes countering the appropriation of gender equality
by racist and right-wing movements as a strategy to por-
tray the migrant Muslim population as a threat to Nordic
gender equality (see Mulinari, 2016) as well as identify-
ing the processes of inclusion and exclusion inscribed in
gender equality struggles due to antagonisms based on
class, ethnic, religious, and national belonging. Address-
ing the differences in terms of access to resources and
power between not only men and women but also dif-
ferent groups of women would, in turn, enhance Nordic
feminist strategies that advocate for a plural notion of
feminisms and the constructive co-existence of diverse
positions regarding gender equality (Cuesta & Mulinari,
2018; Liinason, 2018a).
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